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ABSTRACT
With the assignment of the last available blocks of public IPv4 addresses from Internet As-
signed Numbers Authority, there is continued pressure for widespread IPv6 adoption. Be-
cause the IPv6 address space is orders of magnitude larger than the IPv4 address space, re-
searchers need new methods and techniques to accurately measure and characterize growth
in IPv6. This thesis focuses on IPv6 router infrastructure and examines the possibility of us-
ing heuristic methods in order to discover IPv6 router interfaces. We consider two heuristic
techniques in an attempt to improve upon current state-of-the-art IPv6 router infrastruc-
ture discovery methods. The first heuristic examines the ability to generate candidate IPv6
addresses by finding the most common lower 64 bit patterns among IPv6 router interface
address observed in historical probing data. The second heuristic generates candidate IPv6
addresses by assuming that an IPv6 address seen in historical probing data is one end of
a point-to-point link, and uses the corresponding end’s IPv6 address. Using a distributed
active topology measurement system, we test these heuristic methods on the IPv6 Internet.
We find that our first heuristic is successful in discovering a non-trivial number of new
router interfaces, while the second heuristic is more efficient.
v
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There are currently two types of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses assigned to network in-
terfaces connected to the Internet. The first and most common type are Internet Protocol
Version 4 (IPv4) addresses, which are 32-bit unsigned integers and are usually expressed in
“dotted-decimal” notation (e.g., 74.125.196.147). The second type are Internet Protocol
Version 6 (IPv6) addresses, which are 128-bit unsigned integers and are usually expressed
in hexadecimal notation (e.g., 2607:f8b0:4002:c09::63). The address spaces repre-
sented by both IPv4 and IPv6 are divided into IP allocation blocks by the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA). IANA will assign an allocation block to one of the five Re-
gional Internet Registries (RIR) based on geographical location. The RIRs then provides
sub-allocations out of their assigned IP allocation blocks to an entity. However, the last
unallocated IPv4 blocks were allocated by IANA in February 2011 [1], [2]. With the in-
ability of at least two of the five RIRs [3]–[5] to provide sub-allocations from their allocated
IPv4 address blocks, the availability of globally routable IPv4 addresses is quickly running
out. This exhaustion of IPv4 address space has put increasing pressure on Internet Service
Providers (ISPs), content providers, organizations, and individuals to adopt IPv6 technolo-
gies due to the larger address space and greater availability of IPv6 addresses. Major ISPs,
e.g., Comcast, recently have been experiencing shortages of IPv4 addresses to assign to
their customers. These major ISPs are slowly adopting IPv6 as the larger address space
of IPv6 enables them to better cope with the IPv4 address shortages. As ISPs and content
providers continue to adopt IPv6, it becomes more advantageous for the end user to adopt
IPv6 due to the possibility that, in the future, certain content will only be available to end
users via IPv6.
The specifications for IPv6 were adopted in December 1998 and defined in Request for
Comment (RFC) 2460. While IPv6 has been standardized for the past 15 years, it has
not seen appreciable deployment until the late 2000s. There are several reasons that have
caused IPv6 to not be widely adopted until recently. The primary reason for the lack of
IPv6 adoption is that IPv6 is not backward compatible with IPv4. The lack of backward
compatibility between IPv4 and IPv6 means that there is a need for increased complexity in
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the network and additional resources needed for purchasing required equipment upgrades
to support IPv6. Additionally, the adoption of IPv6 has been slow due to security con-
cerns. While IPv6 was engineered to address certain security issues found in IPv4 [6], it
is believed that malicious actors will find ways exploit IPv6 as an attack vector. For exam-
ple, researchers are already seeing malicious actors using IPv6 to bypass network security
devices due to the lack of IPv6 support or configuration in these devices (e.g., network
firewalls, network management, etc.). Finally, as adoption of IPv6 continues, malicious
actors will discover exploitation methods specific to IPv6 and create new attacks using
these newly discovered exploits [7], [8]. Thus, while the RFC specifies several motivations
that lead to the creation of IPv6, the primary driver today is the exhaustion of usable IPv4
address space [6].
Network Address Translation (NAT) technology provides an interim solution to the issue
of IPv4 address exhaustion by extending the useful life of IPv4. As a result of NAT, wide-
scale adoption of IPv6 has been slow [9]. Specifically, large-scale NAT technologies are
being proposed by ISPs as an alternative to IPv6. These large-scale NAT technologies,
often referred to as carrier-grade NAT, allow an ISP to use private IPv4 address space
within that ISP’s internal network. This allows an ISP to share a single public IPv4 address
among multiple subscribers [10]. However, NAT technologies do not solve the fundamental
issue of IPv4 address space exhaustion. In fact, they introduce a new set of problems,
including inhibiting end-to-end reachability, single points of failure in the network, and the
requirement to maintain a large amount of network state [1], [8].
While the larger address space in IPv6 can support continued growth in the Internet, it also
presents challenges to the efforts of researchers who are attempting to map and understand
the topology of the IPv6 Internet. For example, exhaustive active scanning techniques that
were feasible for IPv4 are not feasible given the size of the IPv6 address space.
The primary goal of this thesis is to develop alternative and efficient methods to discover
IPv6 infrastructure, specifically router interfaces. By improving upon current IPv6 infras-
tructure discovery methods, we hope to enable better insight into the nature of the IPv6
transition and more wholly understand the topology of IPv6.
2
1.1 Motivation
With the continued exponential growth of IPv6 since 2008, approximately a thirty-fold
increase as observed by Google, one can conclude that IPv6 is becoming more widely
adopted. In addition, researchers are continuing to see growth in the core of the network
with respect to support for IPv6. However, it is still unclear how widespread the adoption
is and where this growth is occurring [8], [11], [12].
Figure 1.1: Google’s IPv6 Adoption Statistics as of February 2015, from [11]
To understand the need for alternative and more efficient ways to discover IPv6 infras-
tructure, one must comprehend the size of the address space provided by IPv6 and the
infeasibility of trying to probe all possible IPv6 addresses using current technologies. IPv6
uses a 128-bit unsigned integer to indicate the address of an endpoint, providing IPv6 with
2128, approximately 3.4× 1038, possible unique addresses. In contrast, IPv4 uses 32-bit
addresses, providing 232, or approximately 4.3×109, possible unique IP addresses. Thus,
IPv6 provides an address space almost thirty orders of magnitude larger than IPv4. Given
that the IPv6 address space is orders of magnitude larger than IPv4, it is currently infeasible
to actively probe all possible addresses in the IPv6 address space.
For the purposes of discussion, assume that we have access to all the servers in a single data
center (roughly 100,000 servers [13]) and that each server can probe IP addresses at a rate
of 20 addresses per minute. Using these assumptions, it would take approximately 2,148
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minutes or just under 36 hours to probe the entire IPv4 address space. This is quite feasible
and there has been at least one instance of a botnet operating in a similar fashion to conduct
a complete scan of the IPv4 address space [14]. However, using the same assumptions to
probe the entire IPv6 address space, it would take 1.7× 1032 minutes or approximately
3.2×1026 years to complete, which is an unrealistic timeframe. Thus, a current challenge
faced by researchers and malicious actors alike is to find intelligent and efficient probing
methods in IPv6 for discovering hosts and infrastructure.
1.2 Research Questions
The focus of this thesis is finding alternative and efficient methods to discover IPv6 in-
frastructure. To narrow the scope of our research, we focus on the ability to use heuristic
methods to discover IPv6 router interfaces. A heuristic is a form of problem solving that
uses a practical methodology in order to find a sufficient solution to a problem in a reason-
able amount of time when finding the optimal solution to the problem is either impossible
or impractical. Examples of common heuristic methods include using a rule of thumb to
solve a problem, making an educated guess, and using common sense. The optimal so-
lution to the problem of discovering IPv6 infrastructure, in particular router interfaces, is
to exhaustively probe the entire address space. However, this optimal solution has been
shown to be impossible (Section 1.1). Therefore, we seek to show that by using heuristic
techniques, we can discover IPv6 router interfaces in a reasonable amount of time.
This thesis begins by using historical IPv6 probe data from the Center for Applied Internet
Data Analysis (CAIDA) Archipelago Measurement Infrastructure (Ark) and a large scale
Content Distribution Network (CDN) as inputs into our proposed heuristic techniques. The
output from our heuristic techniques are candidate IPv6 addresses. We then actively probe
the path to these candidate addresses, also using the Ark infrastructure, to determine the
ability of our heuristics to discover new IPv6 router interfaces.
In our research into the feasibility of using heuristic techniques to discover IPv6 router
interfaces, we seek to answer the following questions:
• Does historical data reveal patterns in IPv6 addressing via the host portion of an IPv6
address?
• If there are patterns in the historical data of IPv6 addressing, is it possible to leverage
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these patterns in order to discover previously unknown IPv6 router interfaces?
• Do the discovered IPv6 router interfaces correspond to interfaces on previously
known or new routers?
• Assuming the existence of point-to-point links, is it possible to leverage this assump-
tion in order to discover previously unknown IPv6 router interfaces?
1.3 Contributions
Our research efforts into the feasibility of using heuristic methods to discover IPv6 infras-
tructure yielded the following findings:
• Although the IPv6 address space is very large, there is low-entropy in the host bits
of router IPv6 interface addresses. The host bit values of ::1 and ::2 account for
almost a third of all host addresses observed in historical data.
• A heuristic based probing approach can be successful in discovering a non-trivial
number of new IPv6 router interfaces.
• Performing Internet-wide probing using a heuristic method based off of the 10 most
common host bits of an IPv6 address yielded the discovery of approximately 5,500
previously unseen router interfaces.
• Performing Internet-wide probing using a heuristic method based off of generating
IPv6 addresses by inferring the existence of point-to-point links yielded the discov-
ery of approximately 10,150 previously unseen router interfaces. Additionally, this
heuristic was more efficient than our other heuristic method. This heuristic produced
the maximum number of new router interfaces with the least amount of candidate
IPv6 addresses probed.
1.4 Thesis Structure
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 discusses other IPv6 measurement and topology work, previous related
work on using heuristics to discover IPv6 hosts, and IPv6 alias resolution techniques.
• Chapter 3 outlines two heuristic methods that generate candidate IPv6 addresses and
describes our methodology for large-scale probing of these candidates.
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• Chapter 4 provides results from our analysis of historical data on IPv6 addresses,
results from probing using our most common lower-64 bit host heuristic and our
point-to-point link heuristic.
• Chapter 5 details our research conclusions and provides recommendations for future
research areas related to this work.
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CHAPTER 2:
Background and Related Work
With the current ongoing transition from IPv4 to IPv6, researchers and content providers
are interested in measuring the deployment of IPv6. Various content providers and orga-
nizations, including Akamai [15], Google [11], [16], and the U.S. government [17], all
have web pages dedicated to providing near real-time statistics on the deployment of IPv6
from their respective vantage points. In addition, researchers are actively conducting ex-
periments and measurements to characterize the adoption, use, and evolution of IPv6 using
a variety of metrics and techniques. This chapter reviews features of IPv6 that are relevant
to this thesis, as well as describing related research.
2.1 Overview of IPv6
As discussed in Chapter 1, an IPv6 address is a 128-bit unsigned integer. Its string pre-
sentation format is expressed in hexadecimal notation with the form x:x:x:x:x:x:x:x
where each x represents 16-bits of the address as four hexadecimal values. In order to
shorten the length of an IPv6 address, two shorthand notations have been adopted for IPv6.
The first shorthand notation involves dropping all leading zeros in each sub-portion of
an IPv6 address (e.g., 2607:f8b0:4002:0c09:0000:0000:0000:0063 is equivalent to
2607:f8b0:4002:c09:0:0:0:63). The second shorthand notation uses “::” to represent
one variable length run of zeros (e.g., 2607:f8b0:4002:0c09:0000:0000:0000:0063 is
equivalent to 2607:f8b0:4002:c09::63) [18]. For the purposes of our research, we de-
fine the “host bits” as the 64 lower, or least significant, bits of the 128-bit address. We term
the upper, or most significant, 64 bits of the address as the “network bits.”
In order for a client, router or server to be able to communicate on the network via IPv6
it first needs to be assigned a globally unique IPv6 address. There are three primary ways
to assign an IPv6 address to a device. The first method is via Stateless Address Autocon-
figuration (SLAAC). SLAAC allows the host to generate a unique IPv6 address with the
network prefix provided in router advertisement messages. The host creates a unique set of
host bits by using the Media Access Control (MAC) address of its interface. To form the
full 64-bit host bits, SLAAC inserts the hexadecimal values 0xFFFE in between the upper
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24 bits and the lower 24 bits of the MAC address [19]. The second method used for IPv6
address assignment is Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) in which the host re-
quests an IP address from a DHCP server running on the network. The DHCP server then
assigns the host an IPv6 address to use; often this assigned address is the next available
IPv6 address in a block of values predefined by the network administrator [20]. In the third
method, the host is manually configured by the network administrator with an unused IPv6
address. IPv6 address assignment is important to this thesis because it has a significant
effect on our ability to develop heuristic techniques for intelligently probing IPv6.
2.2 IPv6 Deployment Measurement Studies
Significant prior research has sought to measure the deployment and growth of IPv6. One
of the major challenges faced by IPv6 researchers is that many of the techniques developed
for measuring IPv4 do not translate well, or at all, to IPv6 due to protocol differences and
the much larger address space. As a result, researchers have developed new techniques and
methods to accurately measure and characterize the growth in IPv6. The research discussed
in this section focuses on IPv6 infrastructure deployment measurements; other research not
discussed focuses instead on client adoption of IPv6.
Previous research by researchers from CAIDA [8], [12], focused on using data from pub-
licly available Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) datasets in order to characterize trends in
the growth of IPv6 and compare the growth of IPv6 to the growth of IPv4. Their re-
search showed that IPv6 is experiencing an exponential growth trend while IPv4 growth
is currently increasing gradually and linearly. They believe that the gradual linear growth
in IPv4 is associated with the exhaustion of the address space. At the time of their data
collection, the majority of the growth observed in IPv6 was in the core of the network,
driven primarily by transit and content providers. One specific hypothesis that CAIDA re-
searchers wanted to address was whether the maturing IPv6 topology was becoming more
or less congruent with the current IPv4 topology. They analyzed AS level path data over an
eight year period to test their hypothesis and determined that the similarity between IPv4
and IPv6 Autonomous System (AS) level paths increased from 10-20% to 40-50% during
that timeframe. Thus, they showed that as IPv6 matures, it is becoming more congruent
with the current IPv4 topology.
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While the researchers from CAIDA focused on BGP to measure growth in IPv6, research
by Czyz et al. [21] took a broader view and examined BGP data, CAIDA traceroutes, traf-
fic data from an ISP, and several other datasets in order to draw conclusions regarding the
growth of IPv6. In their study, they focused on sixteen different metrics to measure the
growth in IPv6. Specific metrics examined included the number of IPv6 address block al-
locations, ability to resolve hostnames using the Domain Name System (DNS) and number
of queries being made for DNS Quad-A Record (AAAA) resource records, and the current
usage and traffic of IPv6 as viewed from an ISP. The researchers noticed orders of mag-
nitude differences in the results from each metric, indicating that no one metric can at the
moment accurately measure and characterize the growth in IPv6. However, they were able
to conclude that IPv6 is experiencing a large amount of growth and that the performance of
IPv6 in now comparable to that of IPv4.
Older work from Xiao et al. examined the IPv6 AS-level topology [22]. They focused on
studying IPv6 as a complex network and wanted to know if they could categorize IPv6 as
a scale-free network. It should be noted that this research was done in 2009 before any
major adoption of IPv6 had occurred. However, they were able to show IPv6 was indeed
a scale-free network similar to IPv4 but that the topology of the network was less uniform
than the topology in IPv4.
The previously discussed IPv6 deployment measurement studies focused mainly on using
historical BGP and Ark data to measure the growth in IPv6. Instead, our research fo-
cuses on the ability to use historical active traceroute probing data and heuristic methods to
conduct experimental probing of the IPv6 address space attempting to discover new IPv6
router interfaces. If we are successful in determining the feasibility and effectiveness of
using heuristic methods to discover new IPv6 router interfaces, then we believe that other
researchers will be able to use our heuristic methods to improve their data collection tech-
niques in IPv6. Thereby, increasing their ability to accurately measure and characterize the
growth in IPv6.
2.2.1 IPv6 Measurement Infrastructure
With the ongoing transition to IPv6, and interest by many in measuring the transition,
researchers require some form of dedicated measurement infrastructure. Ideally, this mea-
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surement infrastructure would be distributed, thereby providing multiple vantage points
into the network and offering researchers autonomy and flexibility in their data collec-
tion. An infrastructure able to collect data from multiple vantage points would also provide
researchers a more representative sampling of the IPv6 network. Two such major infras-
tructures have been used to measure IPv6 deployment.
The first infrastructure currently being used to measure IPv6 deployment, and the infras-
tructure we used in our research, is CAIDA’s Ark [23]. Ark was the evolution from
CAIDA’s previous skitter-based measurement infrastructure. Ark uses the scamper pro-
gram to perform topology probing in both IPv4 and IPv6. scamper provides researchers
the capability to perform ping and traceroute network measurements; additionally,
scamper provides support for Paris traceroute, Multi-path Detection Algorithm
traceroute, and various alias resolution techniques [24]. As of February 2015, Ark con-
sisted of 106 monitors, or vantage points, with 39 IPv6 capable monitors [25]. Currently,
CAIDA’s Ark performs topology measurement in IPv6 by probing a random IPv6 address
and the ::1 in every advertised BGP prefix from each vantage point per cycle of prob-
ing [25]. The topology measurement or probe data contains traceroute information from
a given vantage point to a destination address. This data contains the IPv6 addresses of
router interfaces traversed during the traceroute, Round Trip Times (RTTs), and other
data from the Internet Control Message Protocol Version 6 (ICMPv6) messages returned
from the traceroute. In addition to Ark’s automatic collection of topology data, Ark
allows researchers to use it in an on-demand mode. This on-demand mode allows a re-
searcher to request Ark to perform either a ping or traceroute from a requested vantage
point to a specified destination IP address. In our research, we test the ability of our heuris-
tic methods to discover router interfaces by utilizing the topology on-demand mode of Ark.
The second infrastructure that had been used to measure IPv6 deployment is BeiHang
University National Lab of Software Development Environment (NLSDE)’s Dolphin [26].
Dolphin was developed solely to collect topology information and performance information
in IPv6. Unlike CAIDA at the time, Dolphin could conduct near-real time measurements
of IPv6. Dolphin used a modified version of traceroute to collect topology data for IPv6.
However, it appears that this project ceased in 2010 and that CAIDA’s Ark is the only IPv6
measurement infrastructure that is currently active and in use today.
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2.3 Methods to Discover IPv6 Addresses
One of the major issues faced by researchers in measuring IPv6 deployment and determin-
ing the network topology in IPv6 is developing methods to intelligently probe the IPv6
address space. While some researchers primarily focus on measuring and characterizing
IPv6 growth, other researchers are working to develop new techniques to probe active por-
tions of the IPv6 address space. This is a challenge given the size of the IPv6 address
space.
A study of insecurities in IPv6 by Heuse [27] proposed a method for probing in IPv6
that we used for the basis of our heuristic method described in Section 3.2.1. Part of
Heuse’s research was on the feasibility of performing remote alive probing in IPv6. During
the course of his research, he realized that by combining information found from search
engines, IPv6 address databases, and DNS records, he could possibly determine commonly
used addresses in IPv6. Using data from various IPv6 databases and DNS records, he
was able to determine that, from his dataset of unique IPv6 addresses, the vast majority
of addresses (approximately 60-70%) shared common host addresses. Analyzing the host
addresses, Heuse determined that if a host’s IPv6 address was either manually configured
or provided from a DHCP server, he could leverage this information to brute force discover
additional IPv6 addresses. Using this theory, he was able to brute force candidate IPv6
addresses and successfully discovered new alive hosts. Our research seeks to perform a
similar technique, but focuses instead on discovering router interface addresses.
In their research Bellovin et al. postulated possible methods for worms to propagate in IPv6
and divided these methods into local versus wide area propagation methods [28]. The local
area methods of propagation primarily rely upon the ability of the worm to perform network
reconnaissance using an infected host machine. These local propagation methods are not
relevant to our research because researchers often do not have access to the remote networks
they are probing. However, several of the wide area methods of propagation could form
the basis for possible heuristic methods to intelligently probe the IPv6 address space. One
method discussed the fact that IPv6 servers often have low-numbered addresses to enable
easy memorization by system administrators. This method supports the work performed by
Heuse and again leads us to believe that we can leverage this information to find a heuristic
method to discover router interfaces. A second method suggested that an IPv6 worm could
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perform a dictionary search of hostnames using DNS to collect candidate IPv6 addresses
from the returned AAAA records. A third method proposed was that the worm could use
peer-to-peer networks to learn IPv6 addresses of the hosts within the peer-to-peer network.
To accomplish this, the worm would have to participate in the topology maintenance of
the peer-to-peer network, watching and listening for responses to queries, and occasionally
sending queries of its own in an attempt to learn host addresses.
We utilize the techniques described by Heuse and Bellovin in our IPv6 router interface
discovery work.
2.4 IPv6 Alias Resolution
Router alias resolution provides researchers another way to look at the topology of a net-
work. While the focus of large scale active topology probing is to discover router interface
addresses, alias resolution seeks to determine which interfaces belong to the same physical
router. Thus, alias resolution permits researchers to infer the router-level topology of a
network as opposed to the interface-level topology.
Suppose one was to perform two traceroutes to the same destination from different vantage
points. During the first traceroute, at some point along the path interface A is seen followed
by interface C. On the second traceroute interface B is seen followed by interface C. Alias
resolution seeks to show that interfaces A and B are actually different interfaces on the
same router (i.e., aliases) and not interfaces on two different routers (see Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Diagram of an Alias Resolution Instance [29]
Keys [29] surveyed and discussed various methods for performing alias resolution in IPv4
and the ability to use those methods to perform Internet-scale alias resolution. Keys cate-
gorized these alias resolution techniques into two main categories: (a) fingerprinting tech-
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niques and (b) analytical techniques. He defined fingerprinting techniques as those that
send probe packets to different IPv4 addresses and use identifying characteristics from
the responses to infer if the responses came from the same router or not. In general, fin-
gerprinting techniques are more accurate for alias resolution but are dependent upon the
routers being configured to respond to probe packets. Analytical techniques instead at-
tempt to draw inferences about the underlying topology of a network by analyzing the IP
address graph. Analytical techniques rely upon many assumptions and, as a result, are often
less accurate than fingerprinting. Some of the well known and used IPv4 alias resolution
techniques discussed by Keys included Ally, RadarGun, Analytic and Probe-based
Alias Resolver (APAR) and kapar. However, none of these techniques can be used in
IPv6 either because they have not been, or cannot be, adapted to IPv6.
Currently, speedtrap is the only large-scale alias resolution technique for IPv6 [30]. The
previously mentioned techniques for IPv4 alias resolution all rely on characteristics of IPv4,
such as the identification (ID) field in the IPv4 header, that do not exist in IPv6. To develop
IPv6 alias resolution techniques researchers needed to find unique IPv6 protocol features
to exploit for the purposes of alias resolution, similar to IPv4 fingerprinting-based alias
resolution techniques. Researchers discovered that by forcing a router to perform packet
fragmentation, the IPv6 fragmentation extension header could be used for the purpose of
alias resolution. Normally, IPv6 does not perform in-network packet fragmentation, instead
placing the responsibility of fragmentation and reassembly on the end points. speedtrap
performs alias resolution in IPv6 by inducing a router to send fragmented IPv6 packets from
its control plane. speedtrap is then able to extract information from the fragmentation
identification field in the fragmentation header to perform alias resolution using a finger-
printing technique. The functionality of speedtrap has been implemented into scamper.
We use speedtrap to perform IPv6 alias resolution on our newly discovered IPv6 router
interfaces to provide insight into the router infrastructure we are finding via our heuristics.
2.5 Subnet Inference via Router Topology Studies
A third concept that is useful in determining the underlying topology of a network is the
ability to infer subnet information about the network. Gunes et al. [31] studied the relation-
ship between collected IPv4 addresses from path traces of a network and the ability to infer
subnet information from the collected data. Allowing researchers the ability to infer subnet
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information from collected path trace data providing them another means, like IP alias res-
olution, to generate an accurate and complete topology map of a given network. The goal
of subnet inference is to determine whether seemingly separate links discovered via path
traces can be merged into their single hop representation (e.g., point-to-point, multi-access,
etc.). In order to infer subnet relations, Gunes et al. began by grouping IP addresses from
the collected path trace data into candidate subnets based on the IP addresses having the
same maximum x bit prefix. From this maximum /x subnet their technique would then
recursively form increasingly smaller candidate subnets. These candidate subnet relation-
ships next needed to be pruned in an attempt to correlate the inferred subnet relationships to
the actual subnet relationships that exist in the Internet. Gunes et al. proposed a set of four
complementary conditions that assist in pruning down the candidate subnet relationships.
We rely on some of the high-level concepts for inferring subnet information in a network
discussed by Gunes et al. to guide the development of our inferred subnet based heuristic
technique for IPv6 router interface discovery (see Section 3.2.2).
2.6 Recursive Subnet Inference (RSI) Probing Algorithm
While there is currently active research in discovering more intelligent probing primitives
for IPv6, there has been similar work in discovering IPv4 intelligent probing primitives.
An example of an intelligent IPv4 probing primitive is the RSI algorithm. RSI was rooted
in concepts from the Subnet Centric Probing (SCP) algorithm, but went in a new direction
to overcome some of the limitations of SCP. In general, RSI works by performing a binary
search tree over a given input prefix. RSI will use the input prefix to determine the probing
search space and divide the search space in half. The algorithm will generate a candidate
address for probing at the midpoint address in each half of the search space. Based on the
results from the probe, RSI will decide whether to continue recursively dividing the search
space in half and probing additional candidate IP addresses or terminate the search on that




As discussed previously in Section 1.1, it is feasible to probe all possible IPv4 addresses
to determine the network infrastructure in IPv4. However, in IPv6 such exhaustive prob-
ing of the entire address space is unrealistic. Instead, we need more intelligent methods to
discover IPv6 infrastructure and understand the topology in IPv6. One intelligent method
of probing that is currently being researched is the RSI algorithm. Research into an IPv6
version of RSI has yet to be successful but has provided additional insight into subnetting
in IPv6 [33]. This study instead focuses on determining the feasibility of using heuristic
methods to discover IPv6 router interfaces. We used heuristic techniques to generate can-
didate IPv6 addresses for probing instead of performing a binary search in a given prefix to
recursively generate candidate IPv6 addresses for probing.
3.1 Datasets
Our research into heuristic techniques for discovering IPv6 router interfaces utilized two
unique datasets. The first set of data included all of CAIDA’s Ark IPv6 topology probing
from the month of July from the years 2009 to 2014 [34]. General information summarizing
this data is given in Table 3.1. Although this dataset was not used to generate candidate
IPv6 addresses for probing, it did provide insight into how the distribution of the host bits
has changed over a period of six years. Analysis on the historical distribution of the host
bits can be seen in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 and Table 4.1 with further discussion in Section 4.1.1.
The second set of data included all Ark topology probing results from January to August
2014 and a set of IPv6 router interface addresses collected by a large CDN. Table 3.2
summarizes this data. The data provided by the large CDN was only a list of IPv6 addresses
and did not contain any information regarding the number of vantage points or number of
traces used to generate the list. This second set of data was used to generate our list of
candidate IPv6 addresses for experimental probing to test our hypotheses about our two
heuristic techniques.
15











CAIDA Ark July 2009 8 195,678 6,372 3,008
CAIDA Ark July 2010 10 331,968 9,342 4,282
CAIDA Ark July 2011 27 2,245,170 24,980 10,903
CAIDA Ark July 2012 26 3,503,595 39,630 17,716
CAIDA Ark July 2013 31 14,055,506 68,037 34,252
CAIDA Ark July 2014 35 17,044,334 76,452 36,637
Table 3.1: CAIDA Ark IPv6 Topology Datasets from July 2009 to July 2014














40 118,043,837 144,199 77,068
CDN Unknown Unknown 51,327 21,108
Combined Unknown Unknown 164,026 85,021
Table 3.2: CAIDA Ark and CDN Datasets used to Determine Most Common Lower-64 Bits
3.2 Heuristic-Driven Discovery
3.2.1 Heuristic #1: Frequency of Lower-64 Bits
Our first heuristic method is based off of the research previously performed by Heuse as
discussed in Section 2.3. The intuition for this heuristic is that the host bits of IPv6 ad-
dresses associated with router interfaces have low-entropy. Because of this low-entropy,
there exists a set of more commonly used host bits. Low-entropy in the host bits is fre-
quently due to IPv6 addresses being statically assigned by network administrators in such
a way as to ease network management. Often the assigned IPv6 address will be an address
that is easily numbered and remembered by a human and facilitates association. Our hy-
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pothesis is that we can use this non-uniform distribution of host bits as a heuristic to more
intelligently probe and discover IPv6 router interfaces. As a reminder, we define the “host
bits” as the 64 lower, or least significant, bits of the 128-bit address. We term the upper, or
most significant, 64 bits of the address as the “network bits.”
The common host bits heuristic requires two distinct steps:
1. Empirically gathering common IPv6 router interface host bits. For this, we analyze
historical IPv6 probing data from CAIDA’s Ark measurement infrastructure and IPv6
addresses collected from a large CDN.
2. Generate candidate IPv6 addresses, based on the previously determined most com-
mon lower-64 or host bits, for use in experimental probing.
Determining Most Common Lower-64 bits of IPv6 Addresses
First, we examine the general distribution of IPv6 router interface host bits. If the host bits
are uniformly distributed, then this heuristic method will not be a useful technique. To this
end, we examine the Ark and CDN datasets.
The pseudo-code for our algorithm to determine the most common lower-64 bits of an IPv6
address can be seen in Algorithm 1. We first find the set of unique IPv6 addresses parsed
from our datasets, while also filtering out addresses within any of the special use ranges in
IPv6. Filtered IPv6 special use ranges we filtered included multicast, link and site local,
private address space, and IPv6 6to4. From this set of unique IPv6 addresses, we extract
the lower-64 bits of each IPv6 address and maintain a count for each unique lower-64 bit
value. We then rank the lower-64 bits in order of decreasing frequency of occurrence.
Generating Candidate Addresses to Probe
The top N lower-64 bit values from this sorted list are used to generate valid candidate
IPv6 addresses for experimental probing. As shown in Algorithm 2, we obtain a set of
unique IPv6 network masks from the set of globally advertised IPv6 BGP prefixes in Route-
views [35]. For each advertised prefix, we form a candidate address by combining the ad-
vertised BGP prefix (regardless of size) with one of the most common host bit value as the
lower-64 bits of the address. As an example, give the BGP prefix 2a00:1b00:: and a most
common host bit value of ::1:1 we would combine them together to get the following
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Algorithm 1: Histogram of Lower-64 Host Bits Among Set of IPv6 Addresses




for i ∈ Inter f aces do








candidate IPv6 address of 2a00:1b00::1:1.
We create candidate probing lists for the top 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 150,
200, 250, 300, 350, 400, 450, and 500 most common lower-64 bit values. Note that this
method of generating candidate IPv6 addresses could contain a subset of the IPv6 addresses
already present in the historical data. In Section 4.1.2, we address this issue in our analysis
of the experimental probing data.
Algorithm 2: Algorithm to Generate Candidate IPv6 Addresses for Experimental Probing
Input: BGPPre f ixes
Input: MostCommonLower
Output: TargetProbeAddresses
for i ∈ BGPPre f ixes do
for j ∈MostCommonLower do
TargeProbeAddress= BGPPre f ix[i]‖MostCommonLower[ j]
3.2.2 Heuristic Method #2: Inferring via /126 Point-to-Point Links
The second heuristic examines the possibility of using historical IPv6 probing data in order
to infer the existence of point-to-point links. The intuition for this heuristic is that point-
to-point links are used in IPv4 to connect one router to another router and are assigned the
smallest subnet necessary. Figure 3.1 provides a diagram for what we refer to as a point-
to-point link in this research. Router A has an interface connected directly to an interface
18
on Router B.
Figure 3.1: Diagram of a Point-To-Point Link Instance
In IPv4, point-to-point links are usually /30 or /31 [36]. Based on the existence of point-
to-point links and their usage in connecting routers in IPv4, we posit IPv6 routers will be
similarly connected. We hypothesize that given an IPv6 address and the assumption that the
address is one end of a point-to-point link on a /126 subnet, we can discover new topology
by probing the complementary end of the point-to-point link.
The pseudo-code to determine the corresponding IPv6 address assuming a /126 point-
to-point subnet is given in Algorithm 3. We take each IPv6 address from our historical
data and determine if we have not seen that address before and that it is not in any of the
special use ranges in IPv6, using the same steps as discussed in Section 3.2.1. Given a
unique global address, we take the IPv6 address and divide by four, which is the number of
unique addresses in a /126 subnet. Based on the value of the remainder from the division
operation, we either add or subtract one from the IPv6 address. This operation provides the
IPv6 address corresponding to the other end on a given /126 point-to-point link. We store
both the original IPv6 address and its point-to-point complement (ensuring no duplicate
IPv6 addresses are stored). Once we have exhausted the IPv6 addresses from the datasets
we generated our candidate IPv6 addresses for probing. To generate our candidate IPv6
addresses, we take the set of stored original IPv6 addresses and the calculated point-to-
point complement IPv6 addresses and removed the set of IPv6 addresses from the original
datasets.
3.3 Experimental Probing
Once we generated our candidate lists of IPv6 addresses to probe based on both heuristic
techniques. We used CAIDAs Ark Topology on Demand (ToD) service to probe each of the
candidate IPv6 addresses [37]. To send our probe requests into the Ark infrastructure, we
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Algorithm 3: Algorithm to Infer /126 Point-to-Point Links in IPv6




for i ∈ Inter f aces do
if (i /∈Unique)∧ (i /∈ Special) then
Unique=Unique∪{i}
PointtoPoint = PointtoPoint ∪{i}
if imod4 == 1 then
PointtoPoint = PointtoPoint ∪{i+1}
else if imod4 == 2 then
PointtoPoint = PointtoPoint ∪{i−1}
TargetProbeAddress= PointtoPoint \Unique
feed as input into todclient our candidate list of IPv6 addresses. The results from each set
of probing from the Ark infrastructure was stored into an output file for later analysis. By
performing our experimental data collection using Ark we were able to conduct probing
from various vantage points around the world using scamper’s implementation of IPv6
paris-traceroute. In our experimental probing we used 16 IPv6 vantage points, of
these 9 were located in North America, 5 were located in Europe, 1 was located in Asia
and 1 was located in Oceania. Prior to conducting our experimental probing we ensured all
16 vantage points were up and operational. After conducting the probing we verified that if
we issued X number of traces we had X number of results before moving on to the analysis
of the data. In an effort to reduce the probing load on Ark, we limited our probing rate to a
maximum of 500 probe requests being processed by Ark at any given time.
3.4 Performing Alias Resolution on Experimental Results
In order to provide deeper insight into the results of our experimental probing, we per-
formed alias resolution to determine how much new infrastructure we our discovering when
probing our candidate addresses. Alias resolution allows us to determine whether newly-
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discovered interfaces are merely different interfaces on previously discovered routers (i.e.,
interfaces previously unknown that belong to a known router) or are new interfaces on pre-
viously unknown routers. To perform alias resolution on our collected data, we generate an
input file of IPv6 addresses that contain all the unique IPv6 addresses from the historical
data and all newly-discovered IPv6 addresses from our probing.
This list of addresses is used as input into scamper’s implementation of the speedtrap
alias resolution technique, previously discussed in Section 2.4. The output from the alias
resolution is pairs of IPv6 addresses that are different interfaces on the same physical router.
We take each pair of aliased IPv6 addresses and convert them into a listing of all IPv6
addresses associated with a given router. The results from our alias resolution analysis can
be found in Section 4.1.2 for Heuristic #1 and Section 4.2 for Heuristic #2.
21




In Chapter 3, we introduced and discussed two potential heuristic methods for intelligently
discovering IPv6 router interfaces. This chapter initially discuss the results of our histori-
cal analysis of the most commonly used lower-64 bits in router IPv6 addresses. Next, we
discuss the results of our live network probing using the heuristic methods to generate can-
didate IPv6 addresses. Finally, we compare the relative performance of the two heuristics.
4.1 Analysis of Heuristic #1: Frequency of Lower-64 Bits
The intuition for this heuristic method was based on the fact that IPv6 addresses associ-
ated with router interfaces often have low-entropy due to manual configuration by network
administrators. Our analysis of this heuristic method is divided into two separate sections;
in the first one, we will discuss our analysis regarding the frequency of the lower-64 bit
values of router IPv6 addresses from historical data. In the second section we will discuss
the results of our experimental network probing based on the most common host bit values
of an IPv6 address.
4.1.1 Analysis of the Lower-64 Bits in IPv6 Addresses
Before we were able to generate candidate IPv6 addresses based on the most common host
bit values and test our hypothesis, we needed to show that there was indeed low-entropy in
the host bits associated with router interfaces in IPv6. We also sought to determine what
host bit values occurred more frequently than others. We initially began our analysis by
observing the frequency in which host bit values occurred based on CAIDA Ark probing
data as collected in the month of July over a six year period. This allowed us to determine
if certain host bit values occur more frequently than others and if so, how they changed
over a six year period.
Figure 4.1 summarizes the observed behavior in the frequency of host bit values from the
month of July from the period of 2009 to 2014. We observed that a very small number of
unique host bit values accounted for approximately 60% of all the host bit values observed
in the datasets. However, due to this behavior of host bit values, the data we are most
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interested in is compressed against the y-axis in Figure 4.1. Figure 4.2 adjusts the plot axes
to focus in on the area of interest. By focusing on the area of interest near the y-axis, we
concluded that over the six years of data that about 100 unique host bit values accounted
for approximately 50-60% of all the host bit values observed in the datasets.
Figure 4.1: Cumulative Distribution of Historical Lower-64 Bits of IPv6 Address from CAIDA
Datasets from July 2009 to July 2014
Table 4.1 contains the top 10 most common host bit values from the CAIDA July 2009 and
CAIDA July 2014 datasets. In both datasets the host bit values of ::1 and ::2 represented
on average about 35% of all host bit values in the CAIDA data. The next most common host
bit values on average individually comprised less than 1% of all host bit values contained
in the data. It is also clear from our analysis that over time the most common host bit values
do not vary much each year; for the most part the most common host bit values in July 2009
were the most common host bit values in July 2014. A final observation is that the majority
of the top 30 most common host bit values seem to use only the eight least significant host
bits in an IPv6 address.
Additionally, we observed that each dataset shown in Figure 4.1 has an inflection point in
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Figure 4.2: Cumulative Distribution of Historical Lower-64 Bits of IPv6 Address from CAIDA
Datasets from July 2009 to July 2014 (Zoomed In)















1 ::2 1,516 23.79% ::2 13,627 17.82%
2 ::1 849 13.32% ::1 13,429 17.57%
3 ::6 91 1.43% ::3 1,774 2.32%
4 ::3 70 1.10% ::6 602 0.79%
5 ::a 66 1.04% ::a 475 0.62%
6 ::5 64 1.00% ::5 437 0.57%
7 ::12 47 0.74% ::12 355 0.46%
8 ::e 45 0.71% ::4 336 0.44%
9 ::9 44 0.69% ::11 307 0.40%
10 ::16 39 0.61% ::9 307 0.40%
Table 4.1: Top Ten Lower-64 bits of an IPv6 Address from CAIDA Datasets from July 2009 and
July 2014
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the curvature of the graph around 60% to 70% of all the host bit values observed. These
inflection points become more pronounced each year. While we did not pursue any further
investigation regarding the significance of these inflection points. We hypothesize that
the reason these inflection points are becoming more pronounced each year is because
of the growth of IPv6. Coupled with the growth of IPv6 is the need to add additional
IPv6 infrastructure to the network. The increase in IPv6 infrastructure would require the
addition of new routers and router interfaces in the network. As router interfaces are added
into the network, one must assign a unique IPv6 address to the interface. We surmise that
as network administrators address these new router interfaces they first will do so using
addresses from the set of common host bit values. However, once they have used up the
common host bit values, they begin to assign address to interfaces using another addressing
scheme. This addressing scheme appears to be different for each network based on the
presence of the tail in each graph.
To remove the potential bias due to examining traceroute probe data from a single source,
we additionally analyzed data from a large CDN and compared it to CAIDA’s data. Fig-
ures 4.3 and 4.4 both summarize the observed behavior in the frequency of host bit values
from the CAIDA 2014 and CDN datasets. The behavior observed in these two datasets
is very similar to the behavior observed in our earlier analysis. We observed that a small
number of unique host bit values comprised 60% of all the host bit values, and that each
graph has a distinct inflection point.
We then analyzed the combined data sets in order to obtain the most representative view
of IPv6 router addressing. Table 4.2 contains the 10 most common host bit values from
the combined CAIDA and CDN datasets. Once again we observed that the most common
host bit values are ::1 and ::2, accounting for 31% of all the unique host bit values.
Similar to our earlier analysis from above, the next most common host bit values on average
individually comprised less than 1% of all the host bit values.
From our analysis on the frequency of host bit values, we concluded that there is indeed
low-entropy in the host bits associated with IPv6 router interfaces. Due to the low-entropy
we were able to show the existence of a set of more commonly used host bit values used
to address IPv6 router interfaces. With this knowledge, we were then able to perform
experimental testing of a heuristic method that uses the most common host bit values to
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Figure 4.3: Cumulative Distribution of Historical Lower-64 Bits of IPv6 Address from Combined
CAIDA and CDN Datasets
generate candidate IPv6 addresses for probing.
4.1.2 Analysis of Experimental Probing Results
The preceding analysis found an inflection point in the distribution of router host addresses
where approximately 50% of all addresses use one of 500 different host bit values. We
therefore use the combined data from the Ark topology probing results from January to
August 2014 and a large CDN to determine the 500 most common host bit values used by
IPv6 router interfaces. Next, we combined the 500 most common host bits with the19,441
advertised BGP prefixes (as of September 2014) to generate our candidate IPv6 addresses
used for out experimental probing. While we could have conducted the experimental prob-
ing by probing all 500 most common host bit values at once, we broke the probing down
into smaller sets of probing. We created this subdivision for two reasons: first, it allowed
for more granularity in the results allowing us to better observe the effect of increasing the
number of most common host bit values probed to the number of router interfaces discov-
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Figure 4.4: Cumulative Distribution of Historical Lower-64 Bits of IPv6 Address from Combined
CAIDA and CDN Datasets (Zoomed In)
ered. Second, by splitting our probing into multiple rounds we reduced the workload on
the Ark infrastructure and limited the impact on our probing if one of the monitors failed
during a round of probing thereby causing us to restart that round of probing again.
Our experimental probing sets were divided such that for the top 100 most common host bit
values we would probe the top 10 most common host bit values appended to the advertised
BGP prefixes, then we would probe the top 11-20 most common host bit values appended
to the advertised BGP prefixes, and so forth. Once we finished the top 100 most common
host bit values, our probing technique changed slightly such that we then probed the 101-
150 most common host bit values, followed by the 151-200 most common host bit values,
and so forth until we conducted probing for all 500 most common host bit values.
Once we completed our experimental probing, we began our analysis by creating a list
containing the unique IPv6 address hops observed in the collected traceroute data. To
generate this list of unique IPv6 addresses observed, we parsed the IPv6 address for each
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1 ::1 27,306 16.65%
2 ::2 25,376 15.47%
3 ::3 2,519 1.54%
4 ::6 980 0.60%
5 ::a 839 0.51%
6 ::5 835 0.51%
7 ::4 642 0.39%
8 ::11 573 0.35%
9 ::12 563 0.34%
10 ::9 555 0.34%
Table 4.2: Top Ten Lower-64 bits of an IPv6 Address from Combined CAIDA and CDN Datasets
hop in the traceroute output using a similar methodology as the one used for processing
the historical CAIDA Ark topology data. By then removing the IPv6 address that we orig-
inally observed in the CAIDA and CDN data from our list of unique IPv6 addresses, we
are able to determine the new IPv6 router addresses discovered as a result of our heuris-
tic based experimental probing. These newly discovered IPv6 router addresses include
both the probing target IPv6 addresses and the intermediate router address seen on the
traceroute path.
The results of our experimental probing using the top 500 most common host bit values
is shown in Figure 4.5. From the top 10 most common host bit values we discovered
approximately 5,500 new router interface addresses. Additionally, as we increased the
number of most common host bit values probed, we continue to see a gradual increase in the
number of new router interfaces. However, there was a single anomaly in our experimental
data in which we observed a large jump in the number of interfaces discovered. This large
jump in our results occurred between the top 300 and top 350 most common host bit values.
This anomaly was most likely caused by a several month gap in our experimental probing
caused by multiple failures in the Ark infrastructure that required us to restart our probing
of the top 301-350 most common host bits after each failure.
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Figure 4.5: Number of New Interfaces Discovered using Heuristic #1
Using the speedtrap alias resolution technique, we conducted alias resolution using the
164,026 unique IPv6 addresses from our combined data set along with the 18,077 new
router interfaces discovered from our heuristic. We found that 17% of the newly discovered
router interfaces from our probing were interfaces on previous unseen router infrastructure.
Another 2% of the newly discovered router interfaces were interfaces on previously seen
router infrastructure. The remaining 81% consisted of previously discovered router inter-
faces on previously seen router infrastructure.
In our analysis of the experimental probing results, we wanted to see how the probing order
impacts the rate of new router interfaces discovered. To answer this question, we investigate
three ordering strategies: i) decreasing popularity (e.g., Top 1-10 host bits, followed by Top
11-20 host bits, followed by Top 21-30 host bits, etc.); ii) increasing popularity (e.g., Top
251-300 host bits, followed by Top 201-250 host bits, followed by Top 151-200 host bits,
etc.); and iii) random. Figure 4.6 plots the rate of new interfaces discovered according
to each of these orderings. For this portion of our analysis, we only considered the top
30
300 most common host bit values to avoid tainting our analysis with the large jump in
new interfaces discovered due to the several month gap in experimental probing. From
Figure 4.6 we observe that there is a significant effect on the initial rise of newly discovered
router interfaces by selecting the Top 300 host bits in increasing order of popularity vice
decreasing order of popularity. However, there seems to be no significant effect on the
initial rise when comparing the randomly chosen order of popularity to the decreasing
order of popularity. In general, we would expect the number of new interfaces discovered
by randomly choosing the order of popularity to have as an upper bound the number of
new interfaces discovered by decreasing order of popularity and have as a lower bound
the number of new interfaces discovered by increasing order of popularity. These results
suggest that further investigation into the effect of probing order on topology discovery is
warranted.
Figure 4.6: Effects of Popularity Order on Number of New Interfaces Discovered using Heuristic
#1
Finally, we sought to determine the fraction of newly discovered router addresses that were
intermediate hops along the path versus the target itself (since our targets are presumably
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router interfaces). To do this we first examined the fraction of target IPv6 addresses re-
sponding to our probe request. For the Top 10 most common host bit values appended to a
given BGP prefix only 6.5% of the 194,420 target addresses probed responded to the probe
request. As the number of Top N most common host bit values increased the fraction of re-
sponding target addresses steadily decreased. Next, we looked at what fraction of the new
interfaces discovered were the target. Of the 6.5% of target addresses that responded to the
probe request, about 5.6% were new interfaces that were discovered. Table 4.3 contains
the percentages of target addresses that responded to our probe requests and the percent of




















10 194,420 6.52% 5.66%
20 388,840 4.19% 8.41%
30 583,260 3.26% 9.96%
40 777,680 2.68% 11.09%
50 972,100 2.30% 12.05%
60 1,166,520 2.05% 12.87%
70 1,360,940 1.86% 13.88%
80 1,555,360 1.71% 14.72%
90 1,749,780 1.58% 15.35%
100 1,944,200 1.46% 15.77%
Table 4.3: Percentages of Top 100 Target Addresses that Responded to Probing and are Newly
Discovered Interfaces
32
4.2 Analysis of Heuristic Method #2: Inferring via /126
Point-to-Point Links
The intuition for this heuristic method is based on the assumption that point-to-point links
are used in IPv6 to connect routers to each other and that network administrators often
will assign these point-to-point links the smallest subnet necessary. To test this heuristic,
we used the same dataset used to test our first heuristic method. By using the same input
data for both heuristics, we can meaningfully compare the ability of each heuristic method
to discover router interfaces. Using our heuristic as described in Section 3.2.2, we gener-
ate 127,748 candidate IPv6 addresses for use in our experimental probing. We analyzed
the probing results and found that we had discovered 10,157 new IPv6 router interface
addresses.
While we were able to discover a non-trivial number of new interfaces via this heuristic
method, we performed additional research regarding the subnet sizes associated with IPv6
point-to-point links. Our research suggests that there does not yet appear to be a standard
subnet size associated with point-to-point links in IPv6. Some of the literature suggests
using a /127 subnet for point-to-point links [38]; other literature suggests using a /64 for
point-to-point links [39]. The effectiveness of this heuristic at discovering new router in-
terfaces could be improved by additional research using different subnet sizes for inferring
the endpoint IPv6 addresses for a given point-to-point link.
Using the speedtrap alias resolution technique, we conducted alias resolution using the
164,026 unique IPv6 addresses from our combined data set along with the 10,157 new
router interfaces discovered from our heuristic. We found that 16% of the newly discovered
router interfaces from our probing were interfaces on previous unseen router infrastructure.
Another 2% of the newly discovered router interfaces were interfaces on previously seen
router infrastructure. The remaining 82% consisted of previously discovered router inter-
faces on previously seen router infrastructure.
As before in Heuristic #1, we sought to determine whether our experimental probing was
discovering new router interfaces at our target probing address or were we the new inter-
faces discovered simply new intermediate router interfaces. To do this we first looked at
what fraction of the target addresses probed to responded to our probe request. Of the
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127,748 target addresses probed about 40.7% of those target addresses responded to the
probe request. Next we looked at what fraction of the new interfaces discovered were tar-
get address that responded to our probe request; in our experiential probing 31.7% of the
new interfaces we discovered were the target address used for probing.
4.3 Comparison of Heuristic Methods
In this section, we compare our two heuristic methods and their ability to discover new IPv6
router infrastructure. While each heuristic method did yield a non-trivial number of router
interfaces discovered, each method required a significant amount of experimental probing.
One way to compare these two heuristic methods is to evaluate them by the relative measure
of number of new interfaces discovered to the number of candidate IPv6 addresses probed.
For the first heuristic method, using the top 500 most common host bits it was able to
discover 18,773 router interfaces but required experimental probing of 9,720,500 candidate
IPv6 addresses, a ratio of 0.002. However, if we consider only the top 10 most common host
bits for the first heuristic we see significant improvements in the number of new interfaces
discovered compared to the number of candidate IPv6 addresses probed. In this case, the
heuristic was able to discover 5,532 router interfaces with only probing 194,410 candidate
IPv6 addresses, a ratio of 0.028. The second heuristic method instead was able to discover
10,157 router interfaces while requiring only 127,748 candidate IPv6 addresses, a ratio of
0.080.
Overall, the second heuristic method was more effective at discovering the maximum num-
ber of new router interfaces with the least amount of candidate IPv6 addresses probed. Both
heuristic methods performed equally as well with regards to the alias resolution results and




This thesis investigated the feasibility of using heuristic techniques to efficiently discover
router infrastructure in IPv6. While we considered numerous possible methods to study,
our research focused on two heuristics.
The first heuristic method relied upon finding a set of the most commonly used lower-64
bits in IPv6 router interface addresses and appending these most common lower-64 bit
values to all advertised BGP prefixes to generate a list of candidate IPv6 addresses for
probing. We show that, even though there are approximately 1.84×1019 possible lower-64
bit values, only a small number of these are used in the deployed Internet as inferred from
our historical data. Additionally, we observed that this set of commonly used lower-64
bit values remained fairly constant over a six year period. From our experimental probing
using the top 500 most common host bit values, we were able to discover a non-trivial
amount of previously undiscovered IPv6 router infrastructure. By probing only the top 10
most common host bit values, this heuristic yielded the largest number of new IPv6 router
interfaces discovered in a single round of experimental probing.
The second heuristic method relied on the assumption that point-to-point links in IPv6 use
/126 subnets. Similar to our results from the first heuristic, we again were able to discover
a non-trivial amount of IPv6 router interfaces from our experimental probing. However,
unlike our first heuristic method this method discovered the greatest number of IPv6 router
interfaces with the least amount of experimental probing.
In conclusion, we showed that simple heuristic techniques are a feasible and effective so-
lution to the problem of discovering router infrastructure in IPv6.
5.1 Future Work
This section presents suggestions for future work that will build upon the starting point of
our research into using heuristic methods for discovering router interfaces in IPv6.
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5.1.1 Research into Other Heuristic Methods
While we only studied two heuristics in this thesis, additional research into other heuristic
techniques needs to be performed:
• One possible heuristic method that could be studied involves completing the se-
quence between known IPv6 address. As an example, assume that the following IPv6
addresses exist 2001:500:3::42, 2001:500:3::45, and 2001:500:3::46. We
could logically assume that there may exist network devices that would respond to
probing at the following two IPv6 addresses 2001:500:3::43 and 2001:500:3::44.
Barnes et al. have previously conducted research into this sequence completion
heuristic [40]. Their work from 2012 showed they had limited success discover-
ing IPv6 infrastructure using a sequence completion heuristic. With the exponential
growth currently being experienced in IPv6 we recommend that the sequence com-
pletion heuristic should be reinvestigation.
• Another heuristic that could be studied involves searching DNS records associated
with known IPv6 router interfaces and looking for patterns in the hostnames assigned
to the router interfaces. We could then use the observed patterns in the hostnames
of router interfaces to query for associated AAAA DNS records that may return
candidate IPv6 addresses that would respond to probing. As an example, given
the following IPv6 address of 2001:1900:29::a corresponding to a router inter-
face. Performing a reverse DNS lookup with the given IPv6 address yields a DNS
PTR record of vl-5.car1.phoenix1.level3.net.. The returned PTR record in-
dicates several possible patterns used when providing the hostname to this particular
router interface. In this example, we could try requesting the AAAA DNS record for
vl-5.car2.phoenix1.level3.net.. The returned AAAA DNS record provides
a candidate IPv6 address of 2001:1900:29::e that may respond to experimental
probing.
• Finally, a technique that generates candidate IPv6 addresses for probing by partici-
pating in peer-to-peer networks, as suggested in the Bellovin et al. [28], may reveal
previously unknown infrastructure.
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5.1.2 Integration of Heuristic #1 into CAIDAs Ark
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, CAIDAs Ark currently only probes a random IPv6 address
in a given BGP prefix per round of probing. We suggest that CAIDA, in addition to their
current method of probing the IPv6 address space, add probing for the top 10 most common
lower-64 bit values into each round of probing. Based on our results, we believe that
this additional probing will provide additional useful topology data without incurring a
significant amount of overhead in time or processing to complete a round of probing.
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